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The 1998 waterfront dispute has had a number of consequences, not 
the least being the demonstration of inter-union solidarity. It was a 
dispute that saw not just a union and an employer (and a government) 
challenging each other, but a dispute involving the union movement. 
The community assembly at Melbourne's East Swanson dock became 
the gathering place for unionists across the spectrum, . It was not 
just the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) challenging Patrick's, 
Reith and co, but the union movement, responding to the attack on 
one of its own, most dramatically seen on the night of I 8 April. The 
solidarity expressed ~ visually, aurally [the chant of 'MUA ~ here to 
stay'] - spoke of the collective, the unity on which the union 
movement is founded. 
The 'ties that bind' were in obvious evidence - and in Victoria, 
the state's peak union body, the Trades Hall Council (THC) played a 
significant mobilising role in assisting the MUA. It was the voices 
of Leigh Hubbard, THC Secretary, and Martin Kingham, THC 
President, which were heard down at the wharf, day in day out. This 
glimpse ofthe THC highlights the role of the THC - the role it plays 
in the union movement. It focuses our attention on the unifYing role 
that inter-union bodies can play - their industrial, political and, most 
clearly in this instance, mobilising role. 
These bodies can, quite clearly, be sites of expressed solidarity. 
Some accounts of these bodies, however, use very different terms. 
For example, Mark Leier (1995) in his book exploring labour 
bureaucracy through an analysis of the Vancouver Trades and Labour 
Council describes his analysis as that of a 'splitter'. He draws on 
Lizabeth Cohen (from I.H. Hexter, 1975, who in turn used the terms 
coined by a colleague, Duncan Kagan) who contrasted historians as 
either 'splitters' or 'lumpers'. Where splitters explored divisions in 
the working class, lumpers explored unifYing factors and similarities. 
While Leier observed that, "My own preference, by temperament 
and experience, is to examine the divisions in the working class [and 
that What] was noticeable [about working class culture] and needed 
examination were the forces that kept workers from uniting (1995, 
p. 9)", Cohen stated that: "I am interested in diversity in behaviour 
and attitudes, but I set about identifying it by constructing 
comparisons of groups I perceive to be homogenous and distinctive" 
(1991, p. 598) - or, as can be said, 'the ties that bind'. This is not to 
say that the two are mutually exclusive. Cohen argues, and Leier 
agrees, that "lumping must come first for splitting to have value" 
(Cohen, 1991, p. 598; Leier, 1995, p. 9). Cannon says every historian 
must be both splitter and lumper: what he calls the synthesiser and 
the demolition man [sic], "those who construct patterns and theories 
and those who destroy them" (Cannon, 1980, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, in these cases, the forces for lumping prevailed. The 
splits, while traumatic, were not permanent and the THC remained a 
force for mobilising solidarity in the union movement. The maritime 
dispute reminds us of this force of unity. 
To unpack both the forces for lumping and the splitting in the 
THC, the relations between the THC and affiliates will be examined 
through analysis of the THC itself and four affiliates. Here the role 
of the THC from the perspective of unions can be explored and 
different patterns of interaction can be seen. We can see the relations 
between particular union officials and the THC leadership. This 
approach does attempt to mediate against reification of the THC, 
and to enable some sense of agency. The impact of changes of 
leadership on the nature ofthe THC can be seen, for example, in the 
mid 1960s after the death oflong-time Secretary Stout. The forces 
behind splitting and lumping require an explicit analysis in terms of 
power relations as well as the intersection of factionalism and 
ideology. Much splitting and lumping draws on ideology as an 
explanation, justification or rationalisation or guiding principle, whilst 
factionalism provides impetus for both splitting and lumping: factions 
in themselves provide a forum for expressions of lumping, but 
factional differences and conflict promote the potential for splitting. 
This paper canvasses some of the key themes in the literature on 
inter-union bodies, and begins an exploration of power drawing on 
Hyman's construction of 'power over' and 'power for'. This will be 
used to explore the power relations within the THC and between the 
THC and its affiliates, with examples drawn from the I 950s and 
19608. 
Turning briefly to the literature on inter-union bodies, a number 
of patterns can be discerned. One is the lack of both empirical and 
theoretical studies, a pattern found both in the Australian and overseas 
literature. A second is the emphasis in the theoretical works on the 
notion and nature of authority. In the Australian literature this study 
of authority has primarily taken the form of analysis of the national 
peak union body, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) 
with relatively little attention given to inter-union bodies at other 
levels (see Martin, 1962; Dabscheck, 1977; Griffin, 1994; exceptions 
include Markey, 1994, and Ellem and Shields, 1996). 
In many ways, the theoretical vacuum in the Australian literature 
surrounding inter-union bodies should not be surprising, as it 
replicates the general lack of union theory and the still under-explored 
area of union strategy (see Gardner, 1989). The influence of Howard's 
'dependency thesis' has almost been a dead hand on the development 
of union theory in Australia (Howard, 1977; see Gahan, 1996, for an 
assessment of the validity of the dependency thesis). The elevation 
of arbitration as 'the' explanatory factor certainly constrains analysis 
of bodies not primarily fixated by this form of dispute resolution 
(such as theTHC and unions operating in the wages board system of 
Victoria, for instance). 
In the overseas empirical studies of inter-union bodies, the focus 
is more on relations between inter-union bodies, that is, national 
bodies over inter-union bodies at state, province or city level. 
Commonly the story is one of subordination of lower level inter-
This is a 'lumper's' story of the THC, which includes an 
exploration of both tendencies towards lumping and splitting within 
the THC and between the THe and its affiliates over the period 1948-
1974. In the THe we have an inter-union body, an institution which 
reflects lumping, indeed its very raison d'efre being the expression 
oflumping. Any analysis of this body must also, though, make sense 
of the clear and obvious instances of splitting, as occurred in 1948-
51 and more dramatically in 1967-73, where the mass suspensions 
were actually referred to as 'the split' in the THC. These 
experiences mean that splitting cannot be ignored, and that 
EJ these cleavages and their causes must be understood. 
union bodies by national peak bodies . These patterns of 
authority are furthermore complicated by ideological tussles, 
pointing out the added layers of power relations that must be 
explored, not just within, but between inter-union bodies (see Stevens, 
1997 and Clinton, 1977 on the British Trades Union Congress and 
trades councils and Taft, 1957 on the American Federation of Labor 
and Congress ofIndustrial Organisations and state affiliates). 
Another clear pattern is the elevation of the political role over 
the industrial role of inter-union bodies, a significant theme found in 
both the Australian and overseas literature (see Taft, 1968 and 
WaHihan, 1985 in the US; O'Connor, 1989 in Ireland; Petzall, 1979 
and Markey, 1994 in Australia). While there have been some 
exceptions to this (see Saville, 1967; Musson, 1990; GaHan, 1955), 
the dominant argument suggests peak bodies either do or should 
elevate the 'political'. Moreover, many of the authors argue that this 
is a necessary 'subordination' ofthe industrial to political activities. 
Industrial concerns are seen to be more the appropriate responsibility 
or territory of individual unions, rather than the peak inter-union 
bodies. 
Politics and political lobbying are regarded as the province of 
the inter-union bodies, with them being variously described as "the 
political arm of the workers in the state" or as "agencies promoting 
the political interests of labor" (Taft, 1968,p. 3 and p. 248). In 
addition, such roles could be regarded as naturally occurring. Markey 
not only argues that they were "fundamental to the [NSW) Labour 
Council's rationale from the outset", but that "by their very nature 
[peak union councils] also tend to assume significant political roles 
from the start" (Markey, 1994, p. 131 and p. 36, emphasis added). 
Furthermore, this elevation of political over industrial is premised 
on a particular form of politics: was it lobbying over legislative 
reforms, as suggested by Taft, party political activities (after the 
formation of labour parties in the UK and Australia), or broader 
political and social issues? The emphasis on the political, and 
separation of the industrial, was consistent with promotion of 
labourism, whereas adherents of socialism sought to maintain the 
connection between the political and the industrial (see Stevens, 1997 
and Markey, 1994). The consequence was that not aU political 
activities were deemed appropriate (evident both in the literature 
and in practice), with parliamentary politics being elevated above 
what would be defined as political from a revolutionary socialist 
perspective. In the late 1940s, the Australian Railway Union (ARU) 
Victorian branch's Communist Secretary J.J. Brown referred to the 
'cap in hand' [political lobbying) approach ofthe THC, compared to 
direct action as distinguishing between the two. This could be 
contrasted with Markey's assertion that with labourism in NSW 
relying on the relationship between the Labor Council and the 
Australian Labor Party (ALP): "The Council's industrial role has 
generally been subordinated to the political needs of the ALP, in 
order to maintain ... broader advantages" (Markey, 1994, p. 518). 
Reaping the 'fruits of office' meant the subordination of industrial 
activities was made for pragmatic reasons and tangible results. The 
extent to which this could be maintained relied on the ability of the 
NSW Labor Council to point to the benefits and in part also depended 
on an ALP able to deliver to its union counterparts. If the success of 
labourism and hence the dominance of the political was reliant on 
an ALP capable of securing office, then the elevation of this form of 
the political is more circumstance-specific than the standard accounts 
might lead us to believe. 
being gained in 1952, lasting only till 1955, and then again out of 
office till 1982). This is encapsulated in the view of Vic Stout, THC 
Secretary from 1938 to 1964 who, at the time of the 1955 ALP split, 
argued that the party "is expected to serve them" (2.11.55); 
furthermore he asserted that the ALP was a party" ... operating for a 
party purpose to serve the organised workers. We mean to see it will 
be such a party. It should have no other purpose" (c24.1 0.55). 
Oflate we've had quite an amount of politics on our industrial gruel. 
We are essentially industrial. Because we are industrial we can't 
escape the flavour of politics that are intruded in our lives (by those 
seeking to influence IlS) (Stout, 3KZ broadcast, 6.12.55). 
Stout was hardly a radical, but for him, the cleansing of the party 
deemed necessary in the split was a decision made "without regard 
to the loss of government" (c24.10.55). Clearly for Stout, the party 
was there to serve the unions. In short, state specificities need to be 
taken into account. 
In the industrial relations literature, the attempts to explain why 
peak bodies function as they do are also less than fully satisfying. 
The key concern here is 'authority'. The authority debate requires 
examination as it does, at the very least, focus attention on the 
relationship between a peak body and its affiliates but this analysis 
rests primarily on that of the ACTU. We are then faced with 
explanations of national inter-union peak bodies, which mayor may 
not be appropriately applied at, or extended to other levels in the 
union movement. 
Martin (1962) compares the ACTU with the British Trade Union 
Congress (TUC). For him, the 'ultimate test' of internal authority 
lies in the degree to which the affiliate autonomy was restricted by 
the functions ofthe inter-union body "in ways that [affiliates] regard 
as important" (1962, p. 14). Affecting union strategy and tactics, the 
encroachment on "the procedural as well as the substantive raisons 
d'etre of its affiliated unions, and therefore on the most vital aspects 
of their autonomy" was argued to clearly differentiate the degree of 
authority of the ACTU compared to the TUC, particularly that 
exercised over industrial matters (p. 15). 
Dabscheck (1977) has taken issue with Martin's analysis, 
particularly the notion of the 'ultimate test', questioning the relevance 
of a test which, he argues, was rarely invoked. The internal authority 
of the ACTU, Dabscheck asserts, was conferred by the arbitration 
system, supporting his contention that the role of a peak body "can 
only be understood in the context of the industrial relations system 
of which it happens to be a member" (p. 389). He, however, moves 
away from using the term 'authority', introducing firstly' leadership' 
and secondly 'reliance' as alternative concepts to, or proxies for 
authority. Use of 'reliance' appears influenced by Howard's 
dependency thesis (1977), with the dominance of the arbitral system 
providing the basis for ACTU authority over affiliates. The 
relationship with the arbitration system produced what Dabscheck 
calls 'calculative' or 'instrumental' unions, with this instrumentality 
extending to the relations with the peak body: when the union 'needs' 
or 'relies on' the ACTU, the peak body has a greater role or 
importance (p. 400). This would dissipate when levels of reliance 
recede. 
The consequence of Dabs check's analysis is that external factors 
assume a dominance whereby the relationship between affiliates and 
an inter-union body are constructed primarily by the external 
environment. Consequently, agency of both affiliates and the inter-
union body appears nullified, the inter-union body is cast in a 
dependent role and both the peak body and affiliates are treated as 
homogeneous entities neglecting, at the least, the impact of internal 
When exploring the political/industrial functions of peak bodies 
then we need to be aware of two factors - the different interpretations 
of political and that the emphasis on political may depend on the 
strategy pursued and achieved by a political party. What is understood 
as Labourism OZ style ala NSW is not always directly transposable 
to other states, most notably in the case of Victoria where the 
absence of the ALP from holding office created a markedly 
different political landscape (a majority ALP government first EJ 
union dynamics. In the context of the THC, contestation of 
authority, or Dabscheck's 'reliance', was a common feature 
of Disputes Committee meetings, which reflected affiliate 
strategy and thus attitudes towards the exercise of THC authority. 
The factional interplay found within the THC, within and between 
the leadership group and key affiliates, it can be argued, affected the 
degree to which affiliates would allow themselves to be 'reliant' on 
the THe. Greater attention needs to be given to both the internal 
context of the shaping of power and authority, and the complexity of 
relationships found within the peak body. 
With the negation of agency, the inter-union body becomes 
curiously constrained in terms of its power relations with affiliates 
with little said about the capacity ofthe peak body to 'construct' the 
needs of an affiliate or to make affiliates more or less 'reliant'. With 
the willingness of unions to bring disputes to the THC Disputes 
Committee when their officials were, on other matters, in conflict 
with the THC leadership demonstrates the THC had a capacity to 
construct amongst affiliates a notion of reciprocal benefit and inter-
dependence. This was tangible given that disputes commonly 
involved other affiliates, and a negotiated, agreed strategy was usually 
necessary. Restoring a sense of agency and independent action of 
the peak body is important in understanding the capacity ofthe peak 
body to influence the relationship with affiliates, which indeed is 
the context of much of the contlict experienced. 
Griffin (1994) explores the (still limited) literature on authority 
and again is most interested in explaining the growth of the internal 
authority of the ACTU. Just as Martin examined the authority of the 
ACTU by arguing the significance of a particUlar time period (the 
1950s), Griffin does so as well, drawing his evidence from the early 
1980s to early 1990s, the time period now referred to as the Accord 
years. This enables the drawing of a convincing picture of the ACTU's 
expanding authority, evident through a number of factors 
(inclusiveness, changing structure and reduced factionalism, 
leadership and policy development as internal factors with the 
external factors of economic/political environment and the role of 
the state) in that time period. Its usefulness as a model for other 
inter-union bodies is limited both because of the opacity ofthe actual 
exercise of authority by the ACTU (see page p. 87, 88, 100) but also 
the historical specificity of the analysis, recognised in at least in 
passing by Griffin: 
So long as the consensus view remains that a strong peak council 
helps affiliates to maximise their chances of achieving their goals 
significant authority will reside with the ACTU. Changed perceptions 
on the part of the affiliates, perhaps caused by extemal factors ... 
could clearly result in a lesser role, and hence reduced authority for 
the ACTU (p. 100). 
These comments reinforce Martin's earlier observation of 
authority resting on the willingness ofthe affiliates to cede and abide 
by such levels of authority, as well as being reminiscent of 
Dabscheck's dependency or reliance concept. In and of itself, then, 
the peak body has limited authority (though this does seem to 
contradict Griffin's earlier depiction of the ACTU's authority). Just 
as it can be said that unions rely on their members for their power so 
too, it is clear, do inter-union bodies. Another set of questions then 
arise: what power does the peak body have to maintain levels of 
authority, how is that consensus view maintained and how does the 
power of the peak body mediate against external, as well as internal, 
factors which could erode its formal authority? By shifting beyond 
the focus on authority to include broader considerations of bases of 
power, a more complex picture of the relations between the peak 
body and affiliates could be constructed. 
Arguably power, not authority, is the more useful concept for 
advancing our understanding. Despite this, the absence of discussion 
of the concept of power in the industrial relations literature 
has been frequently noted, most recently by Kelly (1998, p. 
9). While the discussion of authority in the inter-union body 
literature at least partly fills this gap, applying an understanding of 
power which enables a disaggregation of power will extend the 
analysis. Hyman (1975) provides one of the more explicit 
considerations of power in the broader industrial relations literature. 
Hyman's discussion of power in unions leads him to distinguish 
between 'power over' and 'power for'. Initially, he characterises 
'power over' as arising in relationships of conflict, citing the 
employment relationship where the power held by either is at the 
expense of the other. 'Power for' is regarded as "as a resource used 
in the service of collective power" (p. 26). Trade unions act to enable 
workers to develop 'power for' so as to exert 'power over' employers 
(p. 27). Hyman characterises trade unions as "an agency and a 
medium of power", and in this context it is recognised that unions 
themselves involve processes ofinternal, as well as external, control. 
As well as unions exerting external 'power over', they themselves 
need to exert internal 'power over' members so as to seek and increase 
to achieve their collective interests, 'power for' (p. 65). Given the 
lack of autonomy and power in the workers' employment relationship, 
'power over' is regarded as "the prerequisite of concerted action" 
(p. 68). But, as Hyman adds, members also have the capacity, through 
internal democratic processes, to exert 'power over' their union 
officials, with electoral mechanisms being the most evident (pp. 73-
4). 
Hyman's notion of 'power over' and 'power for' can be applied 
to the study of peak bodies and their affiliates, enabling an 
examination of the pressures for division and those for unity, and 
how these may be manifested: how lumping is protected and 
advanced and tensions for splitting reconciled and mediated. While 
Hyman applied his notion of 'power for' / 'power over' to individual 
unions, it is a particularly useful concept to use to explore the 
dynamics within an inter-union body. 'Power over' becomes the 
means through which authority will be examined, but it also enables 
the complexity of power relationships to be examined more closely. 
The duality encompassed by the tension between the two aspects of 
power reinforces the complexity of power relations to be found in 
practice, as well as accommodation and contestation between these 
two reflecting the pressures for lumping and splitting. 
Hyman, from a workplace perspective, spoke of 'power over' in 
terms of job control: 
A union can wield effective job control only if, and to the extent 
that, it can mobilise disciplined collective action on the part of its 
members. Such collective discipline is in tum dependent on members' 
willingness to subordinate, where necessary, their own immediate 
wishes or interests to conunon rules and collective decisions (Hyman, 
1975, p. 65). 
Can this be extrapolated to the inter-union level? Is greater capacity 
to secure job control what unions seek from affiliation with an inter-
union body? Certainly disputes with employers and the state could 
be understood to be contests over job control and in as far as inter-
union bodies co-ordinated action, then 'power for' would be based 
onjob control. But Hyman also drew attention to the lack of' genuine 
autonomy' of individual employees; this is manifestly not the case 
when we are looking at affiliates. They do have autonomy and can, 
and do, wage the battle over job control without the intercession of 
an inter-union body. Clearly greater strength may be derived but 
they are not dependent on the inter-union body to achieve their 
objectives. Although this necessarily changes the power relationship 
between the inter-union body's leadership and the affiliates from the 
one experienced between unions and their members, nevertheless, it 
can be argued that affiliates derive a greater capacity to secure job 
control when there is inter-union support and assistance: in 
negotiations, in strike support and financial assistance, with 
prevention of strike breakers. 
'Power for' is less well explained and is referred to as enabling 
'collective power' to achieve 'collective interests', with few 
examples, other than pertaining to wages, given. Certainly there 
would have been substantial debate over what constituted those 
collective 'interests' within a particular union. Moving to the level 
of an inter-union body, the need to determine and agree on what was 
regarded as collective 'interests' for the affiliates as well as the inter-
union body itself would have posed a more difficult and often fraught 
task. This returns us to the issue of union purpose. 
The complexity of the exercise of power over must recognise 
significance of the composition of the leadership of inter-union bodies 
(as with affiliates), and the impact ofindividual agency. Relationships 
between inter-union body leaders and key union affiliate leaders will 
affect power relations within the inter-union bodies. Despite the 
limited discussion in Hyman, the resonance ofthe concepts of power 
over and power for an analysis of unions and the capacity to 
extrapolate to inter-union bodies provide a viable means for the 
exploration of power relationships in the latter. 
Any analysis of the power relations to be found in theTHC needs 
to recognise the tiered nature of those relations. The THC seeks to 
exert 'power over' affiliates so as to exert 'power for' those affiliates. 
To do so, it also requires affiliates to exert 'power over' members so 
as to exert 'power for' those affiliates and their members .. This has 
led the THC not only to discipline union affiliates through suspension 
and, more rarely, disaffiliation, but to expect affiliates to discipline 
members. That affiliates had to take responsibility for members' 
actions was made patently clear, time and again. Pursuit of 'power 
for' could not be compromised by those unwilling or unable to submit 
to 'power over'. This also meant that the Disputes Committee's 
capacity to exert 'power over' relied, in part, to unions themselves 
exerting power over members, so that collective 'power for' could 
be realised. 
Although instances of punitive action were few; more common 
was verbal chastising, a rhetoric of castigation. Some examples made 
this plain. For instance, after repeated disregard of Disputes 
Committee decisions, the Motor Transport Union was told, in no 
uncertain terms, that "it was not a matter of what the Motor Transport 
Union members lose or gain it was a question of giving effect to the 
decision ofthe Disputes Committee (THC Executive mins 24.3, 31.3, 
17.11,7.12.60). Evidently the Motor Transport Union should have 
been more assiduous in ensuring members' compliance: they failed 
to exercise sufficient power over their members. In another case, 
unions whose members repudiated a Disputes Committee decision, 
were bluntly told that "this is an intolerable position and cannot be 
allowed to pass without expecting the unions to see that their members 
loyally obey the [Disputes Committee] decision" (Gas & Fuel dispute, 
THC circular to unions, 18.10.63, emphasis added). Occasions arose 
though when rhetoric was deemed insufficient by the THC leadership. 
Thus disciplinary action was taken against the Clerks Union for not 
only failing to ensure that members respected a Disputes Committee 
decision, but for not taking disciplinary action against non-compliant 
members. The THC's 'power over' hand stretched far in this case, 
the union being told that "this [THC] Executive expects it to take 
severe disciplinary action against the members ... and that this 
Executive would require much stronger action than a severe 
reprimand could provide" (letter from THC to FCU, 16.11.62, 
emphasis added). The Executive motion to suspend the union was a 
strongly worded one: the actions of the FCU members described as 
"a despicable act of anti-unionism calculated to sabotage industrial 
action designed to advance and protect the welfare and interests of 
their fellow workers". More significantly, the union was to 
understand that the rules of that Union became subordinate 
to those of the Council that are appropriate to affiliation and 
that the Clerks' Union, as an affiliated Organisation must comply 
with decisions of the Council and its appropriate committees (THC 
Executive mins, 2.5.63, emphasis added). 
So it was the Clerks Union that transgressed the acceptable and 
so invoked the THC's discipline in the mid 1950s and early 60s: 
where the imposition of the THC's 'power over' appeared to affront 
their view of union autonomy. 
Splitting tendencies aside (for they should not be minimised), 
the 'power for' underpinned by a commitment to lumping saw, in 
the late 1950s and early 60s, the ARU and THC working closely 
together in both advancing power for in the rail industry, but also in 
the eyes of the ARU on broader movement issues as well. After 
claiming that a dispute was "not being led by the ARU. It is led by 
the THC Disputes Committee", ARU Secretary Brown asserted that 
"The railway service grant dispute is a genuine fight by the official 
Trade Union Movement to force an improvement in wages" (ARU 
Gazette, April 1960, p. 2). In 1961 he declared, "Special attention 
must be paid to the work of the MTHC. Good general working class 
activity is now a feature of the struggle for better wages and 
conditions" (Secretary's report to theARU Armual Conference, 1959, 
p. 8; 1961, p. 7), while in 1963, the view was that "The good 
progressive policy which it has pursued on all questions ... has put 
the [THC] in a leading position in the workers' struggles" (Secretary's 
report to 1963 Annual Conference, pp. 8-9). 
Finally it should be mentioned that state peak bodies are also 
involved in a power relationship with national peak bodies. As a 
state branch of the ACTU, the THC could also experience the ACTU 
exerting 'power over' it, as well as over the same affiliates at a federal 
level. This federal/state divide also affects the ability of the THC to 
exert 'power over' their affiliates. With state branches also subject 
to the exercise of 'power over' by their federal bodies, the authority 
of the THC to exercise 'power over' a particular affiliate may be 
contested and constrained. In its relationship with the ALP, the THC 
too has sought to exert power over the political wing of the labour 
movement, so 'power for' the industrial wing can be maximised. 
This means that when looking at the political dimension, it is not 
just the exercise of 'power over' affiliates to ensure 'power for' the 
ALP is protected. 
The potential for conflict, and argument regarding how 'power 
over' should be exercised, therefore is always present, thus creating 
the potential for splitting. The rationale for exerting 'power over', 
so that 'power for' can be achieved, means however that there can 
be agreement or consent (whether complete or partial, grudging or 
wholehearted). In general, the object of exerting 'power over' to 
enable 'power for' elevates the push for lumping. Under some 
circumstances, however, debate about the balance between how much 
'power over' is necessary to pursue 'power for' creates splits. A multi-
dimensional notion of power is required in order to unravel and 
explore the inter-relationships found within inter-union bodies: 
between the leadership and affiliates, between affiliates, within the 
leadership group, between the inter-union body and bodies with 
which itself is affiliated such as a national peak body, relationships 
with political parties. 
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